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OF THE AMENDED TEXAS SEQUESTRATION STATUTE
by Mark Zvonkovic
Although the United States Constitution guarantees that an individual may
not be deprived of property without due process of law,' the procedures re-
quired to guarantee due process are not easily ascertainable. The United
States Supreme Court's analysis of ex parte procedures in the area of provi-
sional creditors' -remedies has led to incongruous results. In Fuentes v.
Shevin2 the Court formulated a strict standard requiring a hearing before seiz-
ure in all but extraordinary circumstances. The Court then departed from
,this standard by holding in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.3 -that an immediate
post-seizure hearing would satisfy constitutional requirements. Finally, in
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.4 the Fuentes and Mitchell
holdings were combined to reach an uncertain result: due process demands
an "early" hearing.
Against -the background of the Court's discontinuity, the Texas Legislature
has amended the Texas sequestration statute. 5 Given the vacillations of the
Supreme Court in this area, the amended Texas statute must 'be cautiously
examined. This Comment will dissect the Texas attachment, garnishment,
and sequestration statutes. The statutes' component parts will then 'be
analyzed in accordance with the standards set by the Supreme Court's hold-
ings and compared to recently amended statutes in other states.
I. THE CHANGING NATURE OF DUE PROCESS IN Ex PARTE REMEDIES
Procedural due process has for more than a hundred years mandated that
an individual whose rights are to be disturbed be given notice and the oppor-
tunity to 'be heard. 6 Nevertheless, state statutes have traditionally permitted
no-notice seizure of a debtor's goods by a state official acting on behalf of
a creditor. Only recently have these statutes come under constitutional at-
tack.7 The following sections will trace the development of modern creditors'
remedies and examine the effect of recent due process challenges.
1. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
3. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
4. 419 U.S. 601 (1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 660 (1975).
5. Ch. 470, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 1246 (to be codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 6840).
6. See Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1-863).
7. Not more than twenty years ago, for example, the remedy of attachment was
considered to be firmly established constitutionally. See S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS'
REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 180 (1967).
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A. History
The history of provisional creditors' remedies8 brings perspective to the
modern remedies and deserves mention. Replevin was originally a common
law debtors' remedy9 brought as a result of the extrajudicial appropriation
by a creditor of the debtor's chattels for the satisfaction of the creditor's inde-
pendent claim. 10 The debtor, who was a defendant to the creditor's cause
of action, became the plaintiff to the replevin action." Upon the receipt of
a security from the plaintiff-debtor, a court would order the local sheriff to
recover the goods for the debtor and "do justice in respect of -the matter in
dispute in his own county court."'1 2 It was eventually discovered, however,
that the delay from such a proceeding caused "great loss and damage" to
the debtor.' 3 For this reason, the Statute of Marlbridge14 was enacted. The
Statute bypassed the need -to obtain a chancery writ and directed the sheriff,
upon a complaint from the debtor, immediately to replevy the goods. 15 The
Statute was subsequently revised to require the debtor to give his pledge -to
prosecute the matter' 6 and post a bond double in value of the goods.' 7
Replevin at common law was separate but comparable to another common
law action: detinue, an action for the unlawful retention of another's prop-
erty.' 8  Modern statutes, however, have merged the two actions into a broad
8. The term "provisional creditor remedy" refers to a broad range of pre-judgment
statutory procedures. Generally, these procedures allow a debtor's assets to be seized
pending an adjudication of a creditor's underlying claim. This Comment will be con-
cerned with two groups of provisional creditors' remedies: (1) pre-judgment replevin or
sequestration statutes which permit a secured creditor to repossess goods in the posses-
sion of the debtor; and (2) pre-judgment attachment and garnishment statutes which
permit seizure by an unsecured creditor for purposes of attaining jurisdiction or prevent-
ing removal or destruction of assets prior to adjudication. Provisional creditors' remedies
may additionally include statutory provisions which allow a lien to repairmen, landlords,
warehousemen, and innkeepers on goods in their custody pending payment for services.
For a general discussion of these liens see Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and
Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 383-403 (1973).
9. Replevin appeared scriptually for the first time in the writings of Glanvil.
Glanvil, writing in the late twelfth century, recorded the writ of replevin (replegari
facias) as follows:
The king to the sheriff, greeting. I command you justly and without
delay to cause G. to have, in return for gage and sureties, his cattle, which
he complains that R. took and kept unjustly on account of customary dues
which he is demanding from G., who does not admit that he owes them;
and afterwards cause him to be justly dealt with, that he need no longer
complain for default of justice in this matter. Witness, etc.
R. GLANVIL, TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND, bk. 12,
ch. 12 (G. Hall ed. 1965). Another example appears at id., ch. 15.
10. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 147 [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE]. For
a general history of replevin see H. WELLS, LAw OF REPLEVIN 4 (1879) [hereinafter
cited as WELLS].
11. BLACKSTONE * 147.
12. Id.
13. Id. Only the King's Chancellor, residing in Westminster, could issue the writ.
WELLS 9.
14. The Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. 3, c. 21 (1267), is the first codification of
the replevin procedure.
15. BLACKSTONE *147.
16. Statute of Westminster 2, 13 Edw. 1, c. 2 (1285). This insured that the debtor
would either prove the creditor's claim invalid, or return the goods if valid. BLACKSTONE
*147; see WELLS 17-20.
17. 11 Geo. 2, c. 19 (1738). If the judgment was then adverse to the debtor, the
creditor's recompense was in the bond. BLACKSTONE * 148; see WELLS 20.
18. Replevin was an action in distress while detinue was an action for goods
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remedy that covers both the detention and the taking.19 The modern re-
plevin action is a creditors' remedy; the only surviving vestige of the debtors'
common law remedy is the posting of a bond to recover the repossessed
goods.20 In Texas the creditor may take possession of goods to secure per-
formance of an alleged debt by a process called sequestration. 21
Unlike replevin, garnishment and attachment arose as statutory remedies. 22
The use of attachment and garnishment as provisional creditors' remedies in-
volves the taking of a debtor's property to secure a possible judgment for an
unsecured and allegedly unsatisfied debt. Attachment28 seizes property in
the possession of the debtor while garnishment24 seizes a debtor's assets in
the hands of a third party. Garnishment may 'be utilized either provisionally
wrongfully detained. WELLS 29-36. If a distreinor claimed a property right to the goods
taken, the sheriff could not proceed with a replevin until the issue was settled.
BLACKSTONE * 148. If the distreinor did have a right to the goods but his repossession of
the chattels was wrongful, the distreinee's recourse was an action in trespass. WELLS 36.
19. Repossession by the creditor under a modem replevin statute for the breach of
an installment sales contract is founded upon the wrongful detention of the goods by the
debtor. See Comment, Laprease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 886, 888 (1971).
20. TEx. R. Civ. P. 701.
21. See ch. 44, [1887] Tex. Laws 30, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAs 828 (1898)
(formerly codified as TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (1960)). Texas has never
recognized the common law forms of action. White v. Texas Motor Car & Supply Co.,
228 S.W. 138, 141 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, holding approved). Replevin exists in
form, if not by name, in an action as a procedure to bring about the release of goods
sequestered. This is accomplished by the posting of a bond. See O'Shea v. Twohig, 9 Tex.
336 (1852); Crim v. Lukenbill, 21 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1929, no
writ); Miller v. Fenton, 207 S.W. 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1918, no writ).
Sequestration is an equitable remedy. A writ of sequestration is issued to preserve
specific property to which a creditor alleges a claim. Accordingly, sequestration is a
judicial deposit of property claimed by each of two parties. The property is brought
within the protection of the court until a final determination of the claim. See generally
6A L. LOWE, TEXAs PRACTICE §§ 1292-1420 (1973). With respect to consumer credit,
sequestration is comparable to detinue, claim and delivery, and replevin in otherjurisdictions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 918-36 (Supp. 1973) (detinue); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 1-472 to -484.1 (Supp. 1974) (claim and delivery); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1821 (1967) (replevin).
22. Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934). Although attachment
and garnishment did not develop from common law forms as did replevin, they
traditionally date back to the middle ages. Garnishment, for example, was originally a
child of "foreign attachment," which permitted a creditor to attach the foreign debtor's
goods found in the medieval English boroughs. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 387 (4th ed. 1936). A discussion of the American adaptation of this
principle is found in B. Mouus, SELECT CAsES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF NEw YORK
CITY 1674-1784, at 19 (1935). A concise examination of the history of garnishment is
found in Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MHN,. L. REv. 1, 7-17
(1942).
23. Attachment places a lien on a debtor's property in order to furnish security for
the satisfaction of a possible judgment. Attachment has a twofold purpose: (I) to
prevent a debtor from alienating, destroying, or removing his property from the jurisdic-
tion in order to frustrate the debt; or (2) to attain jurisdiction over a nonresident debtor
who owns property within the jurisdiction. See Comment, Attachment and
Garnishment-Prejudgment Garnishment-Study and Proposed Revisions, 9 NATURA.
REsouR eS J. 119, 120 (1969). For a discussion of attachment in Texas see 6 L. LowE,
supra note 21, §§ 691-820.
24. Garnishment is actually a species of attachment used chiefly as a collection
device. Until Sniadach the action was predominantly used with respect to wages. See
Comment, Constitutional Law-Garnishment-Prejudgment Wage Garnishment, in Ab-
sence of Conditions Requiring the Special Protection of a State or Creditor Interest
Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1400,
1401-02 (1969). For a discussion of garnishment in Texas see 6 L. LowE, supra note 21,
§§ 821-950.
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or after attaining judgment. 2 5 Attachment, on the other hand, is only a pre-
ventive remedy, ancillary to a main suit, which may secure property in which
the creditor has no real interest, pending judgment on the debt.26 Conse-
quently, attachment is normally used where there is danger the debtor may
fail to satisfy a judgment. 27 Neither remedy may be used to take possession
of property which is exempt by statute.
28
B. Due Process Attack
To the modern legal sensibilities any procedure utilized for -the taking of
one's property without an opportunity to be heard is immediately suspect.
However, until recently, various forms of provisional creditors' remedies did
just that.29 Faced with -three due process challenges to provisional creditors'
remedies in the 1920's the United States Supreme Court held the remedies
constitutional.80  A short time later the Court announced that the -final de-
termination of the liability accorded sufficient due process. 31  Provisional
remedies affecting property have 'been upheld on a variety of grounds, includ-
ing the lack of significant state action,3 2 contractual waiver by one of the par-
ties,33 an overriding government interest in the seizure,3 4 and even tradition.35
The first successful due process attack upon provisional creditors' remedies
came in 1969.36 In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.3 7 the Court held that
the garnishment of a workman's wages without a prior hearing violated due
25. For an example of a garnishment statute see TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4076 (1966).
26. For an example of an attachment statute see art. 275.
27. See note 23 supra.
28. For example, wages for personal services are exempt in Texas. TEX. CONsT. art.
XVI, § 28; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (1966).
29. See notes 19-26 supra and the accompanying text. It must be noted, however,
that the provisional remedies existing in England six centuries ago were distinguishable
from the remedies that have recently been challenged on due process grounds in this
country. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1972).
30. In Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), the Court, noting the remedies' long
history, found strong state interests in the provisional remedy of attachment and upheld
the attachment of a foreign debtor's property so as to facilitate the state's obtainment ofjurisdiction over the nonresident debtor. Finding a strong state interest in the protection
of bank deposits, the Court, in Coffin Brothers & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928),
affirmed a no-notice seizure of the assets in an insolvent bank's stockholder. Finally, in a
case involving only a state's interest in aiding the collection of debts, the Court, in
McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929), af'g per curiam 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699
(1928), affirmed a statute authorizing prehearing seizure of goods.
31. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931).
32. Self-help repossession under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504 does not
involve significant state action requiring due process. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l
Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'g 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). For a
discussion see Note, Self-Help Repossession Under the UCC: Presence or Absence of
State Action?, 28 Sw. L.J. 796 (1974). But see Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust
Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973).
33. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
34. See Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921).
35. See Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennet, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
36. There was some litigation in the lower courts between 1929 and 1969 which
upheld the validity of provisional remedies. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Milm, 127 Vt. 249,
246 A.2d 837 (1968); Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 945 (1932). For a
general view of the lower courts' decisions during this time period see Note, Procedural
Due Process-The Prior Hearing Rule and the Demise of Ex Parte Remedies, 53 B.U.L.
REV. 41, 44 (1973).
37. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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process of law.38 Departing from the traditional methods of determining
whether due process should be applicable, the Court considered the severity
of -the deprivation upon the one whose property was seized. 39 Since the prop-
erty seized was one of a "specialized type," 40 ,the Court determined that a
prior hearing was necessary. 41 Although the Sniadach opinion initiated more
problems than it resolved, 42 the Court's association of the "nature" of the
property seized with the "problems of procedural due process ' 43 suggested
a new constitutional approach in the area of provisional creditors' remedies. 4 4
Three years later, in Fuentes v. Shevin,45 -the Court took a step in this new
direction by holding that an individual -must be afforded a hearing prior to
the seizure of any significant property interest except in the case of "extraor-
dinary situations" which involve strong governmental interests.46 This "ex-
traordinary situation" terminology in Fuentes was obverse to the "specialized
type of property" language of Sniadach. A prior hearing was no longer an
exception, it was a requirement protecting an individual from "substantively
unfair or mistaken deprivations of property. '47  In reaching this conclusion
the Court refused to attempt to "accommodate all possible interests."'48
Rather, the Court concluded that "[p]rocedural due process ... is intended
to protect ,the particular interests of the person whose possessions are about
to be taken."' 49 Only upon a clear showing of exceptional circumstances
could such protection be disturbed.50
The expansive definition of due process in Fuentes occasioned an extensive
38. Id. at 342.
39. Id. at 340-42.
40. Id. at 340.
41. Id. at 342.
42. The Court left unclear whether "specialized property" would include property
other than wages. Additionally, the Court did not provide a format for a required prior
hearing. For a discussion of these areas by commentators writing immediately after
Sniadach see Clark & Landers, supra note 8, at 357-58; Hawkland, Prejudgment Garnish-
ment of Wages After Sniadach, 75 CONN. L.J. 5, 7 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1968
Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 115-16 (1969).
43. 395 U.S. at 340. The Court also stated that summary garnishment procedures
may satisfy due process requirements in "extraordinary situations." Id. at 339.
44. The Court did not weigh the state's interests as it had done in the three 1920's
cases. See note 29 supra. In addition, the Court did not discuss the balancing of public
and private interests. See Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment Is a Denial of
Due Process; The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of the Law, 68
MICH. L. Rlv. 986, 995 n.51 (1970). The "extraordinary situations" statement coupled
with the strong consumer interests involved in a provisional seizure of personal property
(e.g., refrigerators, cars) is more than suggestive that the Sniadach opinion would not be
solely confined to the garnishment of wages. Id. at 1000-01. Contra, Hawkland, Prejudg-
ment Garnishment of Wages After Sniadach, 75 COM. L.J. 5, 7 (1970). The Court soon
after Sniadach recognized that the form of procedural due process required would depend
upon the "importance of the interests involved." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
378 (1971). See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
45. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
46. A seizure prior to a hearing will be upheld only when the seizure is necessitated
by a compelling governmental interest, there is need for prompt action, and the
procedure for such a seizure requires a proper government official to determine under
narrowly constructed statutes when the seizure is necessary and justified. Id. at 91. For
examples provided by the Court see id. at 92.
47. Id. at 81.
48. Id. at 90 n.22.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 90-91.
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attack in -the lower courts on a wide range of provisional creditors' remedies.51
However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that Fuentes
was in fact an unwarranted leap5 2 from which there was no recourse but re-
treat. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.53 the Court upheld a Louisiana seques-
tration statute54 which permitted a prehearing seizure of goods. Unfortu-
nately, the majority in Mitchell merely put a whitewash over the due process
portrait painted in Fuentes.55 Distinguishing the Louisiana statute from the
statutes held unconstitutional in Fuentes,56 the Court determined that repos-
session under a state statute is constitutional when the statute provides safe-
guards which minimize the risk of a wrongful repossession.57 Conversely, the
Fuentes decision had found that no risk was acceptable where a prior hearing
could limit the possibility of error.55  Due process, the Mitchell Court rea-
soned, is a flexible standard ithat must accommodate all possible situations
rather than a rigid predetermined rule which will apply in all cases. 59 Min-
imization of risk provided such an accommodation for the Court, and the ju-
dicially supervised safeguards in the Louisiana statute achieved that accom-
modation.60
The most significant conflict between -the Mitchell and Fuentes decisions
involves the examination of the nature of creditor-debtor relationships. The
Court in Mitchell focused on the dangers shouldered by the creditor when
the debtor is in possession of the goods.6 ' Repossession protects the cred-
51. An examination of the subsequent litigation applying Fuentes is beyond the
scope of this Comment. For a short but encompassing listing of these cases see Note,
Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process-Georgia Prejudgment Garnishment Stat-
ute Violates Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by Failing To Provide
Necessary Procedural Safeguards in the Absence of Prior Notice and Hearing, 28 VAND.
L. REv. 908, 913-14 n.45 (1975). For an excellent commentator's view of the effects of
the Fuentes decision see Clark & Landers, supra note 8, at 359-409.
52. The Court has been criticized for deciding Fuentes with only seven Justices
present. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, newly appointed, did not
participate in the consideration or decision. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 616-19 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
54. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961).
55. The Court did not overrule Fuentes. Accordingly, statutes similar to the New
York and Pennsylvania statutes in Fuentes remain unconstitutional. See, e.g., Garcia v.
Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp. 1364,
1365 (W.D. Tenn. 1974). However, many did conclude that Fuentes, in effect, had been
overruled. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 623 (1974) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Id. at 634 (Stewart, Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Id. at 636 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432, 436 (S.D. Fla. 1974); The Supreme
Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 71-83 (1974); Note, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant-
The Repossession of Fuentes, 5 MEMPHIS ST. L. REv. 74, 87 (1974).
56. 416 U.S. at 615-16.
57. The particular safeguards of the Louisiana statute as pointed out by the majority
may be summarized as follows: the sequestration writ may only be issued by a judicial
officer, not a clerk; the writ may only be issued upon the submission of an affidavit
containing specific factual evidence which establishes the debtor's alleged default and the
possibility the debtor may conceal, destroy, or dispose of the collateral; the creditor must
initiate a collection suit prior to the request for a writ; the creditor must post a bond; the
debtor is given the opportunity for an immediate post-seizure hearing at which he may
dispute the creditor's allegations; and, as an alternative to the post-seizure hearing, the
debtor may post a bond to regain possession of the seized property. Id. at 605-07.
58. 407 U.S. at 81-83.
59. 416 U.S. at 607.
60. See note 57 supra.
61. The creditor is only protected by the debtor's installment payments. 416 U.S. at
608. Upon default and pending litigation the creditor runs the risk of the debtor's
1975]
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itors' security interest in the goods. Prior hearing and notice increases the
likelihood that a debtor, acting in bad faith, will defraud the creditor of his
security interest. 62  As to the effect of deprivation upon the debtor, the
Mitchell decision recited that "his basic source of income is unimpaired. '6 3
The statement is reminiscent of the "specialized type of property" termi-
nology in Sniadach.64 Fuentes, on the other hand, had given extensive
consideration to the impact of a deprivation of a debtor's property65 and
concluded that subjective analysis of the "importance" or "necessity" of a
debtor's goods must not be a part of objective application of due process.66
The Court's decision in Mitchell was a well-aimed attack on the com-
parably rigid due process standard set forth in Fuentes. One may fairly con-
clude that the Court in Mitchell was more concerned with the demise of
Fuentes than it was with evincing a workable solution to the applicability of
due process to provisional creditors' remedies. Rather than rework the Snia-
dach and Fuentes holdings into a comprehensive and flexible test for future
cases, the Mitchell decision, announcing that interests must be balanced and
that balancing must be flexible, merely provided a roster of creditors' interests
in ex parte remedies. Subsequently, one court strictly applying Mitchell
reached a harsh conclusion.6 7 Nevertheless, the concept of a flexible accom-
modation of due process to a particular situation by a balancing process 8
may ultimately be a redeeming facet of the Mitchell opinion. If due process
is to protect an individual's rights, the Court is correct in stating that a cred-
itor's interests must be balanced with the debtor's. Assuming a "balancing
of interests" doctrine is to be the measure by which due process is applied,
the Court in Mitchell left these questions unanswered: What, if not all, inter-
ests of a creditor and debtor must 'be taken into consideration? What proce-
dures are necessary to insure that a just "balancing of interests" may be
concealment, alienation, or destruction of the goods. Id. at 608-09. This is especially true
in Louisiana where a sale of the goods by the debtor will pat them out of the creditor's
reach. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3228 (West 1952). In a jurisdiction which has
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code the seller has a stronger position with respect to
transferees of the buyer. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307.
62. 416 U.S. at 609.
63. Id. at 610.
64. 395 U.S. at 340.
65. 407 U.S. at 82.
66. Id. at 89-90.
67. For example, in Guzman v. Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D.
1974), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 2398 (8th Cir. Mar. 11, 1975), a secured creditor's assignee
attached buyer's mobile home, an act resulting in buyer's eviction. Rejecting the buyer's
constitutional challenge, the court, citing Mitchell, stated that protection against hard-
ships brought about by summary deprivation is not a right guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. 381 F. Supp. at 1267. For a contrary result see Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage,
Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 762, 358 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
68. The balancing test suggested by Mitchell involves the individual interests of
creditor and debtor. Due process balancing by the Court had previously involved a
debtor's interest weighed against the government's interest. See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594, 598 (1950); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931). The
Fuentes decision used a balancing process to the extent that a prior hearing would be
required unless outweighed by a special state or creditor interest. 407 U.S. at 90-93. The
Mitchell opinion acknowledged the creditor's interest in state remedies which protect his
property, insure the preservation of credit, and expedite the flow of commerce. Id. at




accomplished? Should there be standards under which a debtor must be
afforded a prior hearing?
In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.09 the Court did not pro-
vide answers to these questions. In an apparent attempt to reconcile the con-
flict of Fuentes and Mitchell the Court held a Georgia garnishment procedure
unconstitutional -for failure -to provide sufficient safeguards against wrongful
ex parte action.70 Without providing specific grounds for its decision, the
Court cited both Fuentes and Mitchell favorably. The opinion affirms the
Fuentes position that due process must always be accorded a debtor whose
property is seized under an ex parte procedure. 71 However, in an evident
accommodation of Mitchell, the Court stated that due process mandates an
early hearing rather than a prior hearing. 72 The early hearing under North
Georgia Finishing must be occasioned by the safeguards provided by the stat-
ute upheld in Mitchell.73
Although North Georgia Finishing does not offer a ready solution to the
problems surrounding application of procedural due process to provisional
creditors' remedies, it does resolve much of the confusion engendered by the
Fuentes-Mitchell conflict. Procedural due process emerges from North
Georgia Finishing as a flexible animal. The Court has done away with the
"specialized type of property" and "extraordinary situations" terminology
which had given rise to so much confusion. There is still no guidance as
to when or if a prior hearing will be afforded. The Court's "early hearing"
terminology avoids that issue. However, it does appear that all interests of
both creditor and debtor will now be considered. As to what procedures will
be necessary adequately to protect these interests, the Court has merely, for
now, left the Mitchell safeguards intact. But the diversity of interests in-
volved in creditor-debtor relationships must counsel against taking assurance
that compliance with the Mitchell safeguards insures constitutionality. North
Georgia Finishing cannot 'be construed to be such a guarantee. If there is
to be a guarantee from North Georgia Finishing, it must be that the Court
has not yet spoken its last word concerning provisional creditors' remedies.
H. DUE PROCEss ATTACK ON TEXAS LAW
The Supreme Court's due process attack on provisional creditors' remedies
had some effect on all the states.74 Three state statutes fell under Sniadach75
69. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
70. Id. at 606-07.
71. "Although the length or severity of a deprivation of use or possession would be
another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing, it was not
deemed to be determinative of the right to a hearing of some sort." Id. at 606.
72. Id. at 607.
73. Id. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
74. When the Court decided Fuentes in 1972 only Delaware and Kentucky did not
have ex parte replevin procedures. The California statute in 1971 had been held
unconstitutional by a state court. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96
Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971). These states, however, were affected by an ensuing attack in lower
courts on self-help remedies under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504. See Adams
v. Ecley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal.
First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973); Note, supra note 32.




and Fuentes.76 Mitchell, however, upheld an ex parte sequestration statute. 77
Commentators and courts subsequently reviewed state statutes by a compari-
son with the statutes which had been subject to Supreme Court scrutiny, 78
especially the statute upheld in Mitchell.79 Yet, in North Georgia Finishing
-the Court was faced with a statute that, upon a simple comparison to
Mitchell, could clearly have been declared unconstitutional.80
The Court did not follow that route, however, choosing rather to offer an
approach which combined the Mitchell safeguards with a modified version
of Fuentes."' As a result, any method of analysis which simply utilizes a
mechanical comparison to any of the statutes reviewed by the Court is ques-
tionable. s 2 Analysis of existing state statutes must take into consideration
two interdependent factors: the balancing of all interests involved in debtor-
creditor controversies may demand a more adaptable and expansive system
of safeguards to accommodate those interests, and an early hearing may in
some situations demand an opportunity for some form of prior hearing.
Immediately following the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in Garcia v.
Krause,88 adjudged the Texas sequestration statute8 4 unconstitutional. 85  By
a mechanical comparison of the Texas sequestration statute and its corre-
sponding procedural rules8 6 with the Louisiana procedure upheld in Mitchell,
the court found Texas sequestration deficient in three areas.8 7 First, the stat-
ute failed to require judicial supervision.88 Mitchell had demonstrated -that
the Louisiana statute 9 provided a required safeguard by allowing only a
judge to issue the writ. 90  Conversely, under the Texas statute a writ could
be issued by a clerk of the court.9 ' The second deficiency regards the cred-
76. Fuentes struck down the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes: FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 78.01-.21 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1821-47 (1967). The Florida
statute has been revised to conform with the Court's holding. FLA. STAT. ANN. 78.01-
.21 (Supp. 1975).
77. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. arts. 3501-14, 3571-76 (West 1961).
78. A federal district court in New York characterized this as follows: "The issue
before us . . . is whether the New York provisions. . . squeeze through the narrow door
of constitutionality left open in Mitchell, or remain out in the unconstitutional territory
chartered in Fuentes." Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 647 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
79. See Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Comment,
Procedural Due Process: For Sale in Texas to the Highest Bidder, 10 Hous. L. REv. 880,
886-89 (1973).
80. 419 U.S. at 607.
81. See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text.
82. The Court's decision not simply to apply the Mitchell decision to the Georgia
garnishment statute may suggest that the constitutionality of ex parte procedures will
hereafter be decided on a case-by-case basis. See 419 U.S. at 620 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting).
83. 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
84. Ch. 44, [1887] Tex. Laws 30, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAs 828 (1898)(formerly codified as TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (1960)).
85. The district court had stayed its decision pending the Supreme Court's final
determination in Mitchell. 380 F. Supp. at 1256.
86. The procedural rules governing the Texas sequestration statute are set out in
TEX. R. Crv. P. 696-716.
87. 350 F. Supp. at 1259.
88. Id.
89. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. arts. 3501-14, 3571-76 (West 1961).
90. 416 U.S. at 604.
91. Ch. 44, [1887] Tex. Laws 30, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAs 828 (1898)
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itor's affidavit. 92 Under the Louisiana practice the creditor's affidavit must
clearly set forth specific facts which may entitle the creditor to ex parte seiz-
ure.93 The Texas procedure merely required the creditor to submit the con-
clusory allegation that he is entitled to the property. 94  Finally, the Texas
procedure lacked the safeguard upon which the Court in Mitchell had placed
so much emphasis: an immediate post-seizure hearing.95 The Louisiana
practice explicitly entitles the debtor ,to an immediate post-seizure 'hearing at
which the writ may be dissolved should the creditor fail to prove the grounds
upon which the writ was issued.96 There was no provision in the Texas
statute for any hearing at which the creditor would be required to prove
the alleged grounds for the seizure. 97  For failure to provide these safe-
guards approved in Mitchell, the court held that the Texas sequestration
procedures did not "meet constitutional muster."98s
In evident response to Garcia -the Texas Legislature recently amended the
sequestration statute99 to conform to -the Mitchell safeguards elucidated in
Garcia.100 Only a judicial officer may now issue a writ of sequestration in
Texas. 101 For a writ to issue, section 1 necessitates a "reasonable conclusion"
that the property in question is in "immediate danger.' 0 2 Section 2 provides
that a creditor must submit an application under oath which contains specific
facts demonstrating ,the nature of the claim, the amount in controversy, and
the grounds for issuance of the writ.' 0 3 Sections 1 and 2, when read together,
(formerly codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (1960)). In North Georgia
Finishing, however, Justice Powell suggests that a clerk may issue a writ so long as a
prompt post-seizure hearing is conducted by a judge. 419 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
92. 350 F. Supp. at 1259.
93. The Louisiana procedure calls for a showing by specific facts that the creditor isjustified in fearing that the debtor will "conceal, dispose of, or waste the property, or the
revenues therefrom, or remove the property from the parish, during the pendency of the
action." LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961).
94. In Texas the creditor was required to describe the property, state that he is the
owner and allege that he is entitled to possession. TEx. R. Civ. P. 696. In addition, the
creditor was required to give an oath that he fears the debtor will injure, ill-treat, waste,
destroy, or remove the property from the court's jurisdiction during the pendency of the
suit. Ch. 44, [1887] Tex. Laws 30, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 828 (1898).
95. 416 U.S. at 607.
96. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961).
97. Pending litigation of the creditor's claim in Texas, the debtor could only regain
possession of the seized property by posting a replevy bond. TEX. R. Civ. P. 701.
98. 380 F. Supp. at 1259.
99. Ch. 470, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 1246, amending ch. 44, § 1, [1887] Tex. Laws
30, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 828 (1898).
100. See notes 88-97 supra and accompanying text.
101. Section 1 of the amended article 6840 provides in part: "Judges of the district
and county courts and justices of the peace shall, at the commencement or during the
progress of any civil suit, before final judgment, have power to issue writs of sequestra-
tion .... ." Ch. 470, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 1246. There may be some question as to
whether a justice of the peace qualifies as the "judicial officer" required by the Court in
Mitchell. Interview with Joseph W. McKnight, Professor, Southern Methodist University
School of Law, Nov. 3, 1975.
102. Section 1 of the amended article 6840 provides in part: "[A] writ of sequestra-
tion may be issued if a reasonable conclusion may be drawn that there is immediate
danger that the defendant or party in possession thereof will conceal, dispose of, ill-treat,
waste or destroy such property, or remove the same out of the limits of the county during
the pendency of the suit." Ch. 470, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 1246-47.
103. Section 2 of the amended article 6840 provides: "The application for the
issuance of the writ shall be made under oath and shall set forth specific facts stating the
1975]
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appear to prevent the issuance of a writ upon mere conclusory allegations.
A writ will issue under the amended statute only after a creditor has alleged
specific facts which enable a judicial officer to draw a reasonable conclusion
that issuance is justified. Section 4 of the amended statute104 requires notice
be given the one dispossessed that he may regain possession either by filing
a motion to dissolve the writ'05 or by posting a replevy bond. 106  Section 3
provides for an immediate post-seizure hearing not later than ten days after
a debtor's motion for dissolution. The writ will be dissolved unless the cred-
itor proves the allegations and grounds relied upon for the issuance. 10 7  If
the writ is dissolved the creditor's action will, nevertheless, continue as if no
writ had been issued.' 08
The most noticeable aspect of the amended Texas sequestration statute is
its similarity to the Louisiana procedures upheld in Mitchell. A mirror-image
of the Louisiana statute, however, is not decidedly constitutional. The imme-
diate problem for the amended Texas statute is the Supreme Court's failure
nature of the plaintiff's claim, the amount in controversy, if any, and the facts justifying
the issuance." Id. at 1247.
104. Section 4 of the amended article 6840 provides: 4,
Sec. 4. Requisites of Writ of Sequestration. There shall be promi-
nently displayed on the face of the writ, in 10-point type and in a manner
calculated to advise a reasonably attentive person of its contents, the
following:
"YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO REGAIN POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY BY FILING A 'REPLEVY' BOND.
"YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO SEEK TO REGAIN POSSESSION
OF THE PROPERTY BY FILING WITH THE COURT A MO-
TION TO DISSOLVE THIS WRIT."
Id. at 1247-48.
105. See note 107 infra.
106. TEx. R. Civ. P. 701.
107. Section 3 of the amended article 6840 provides:
Sec. 3. (a) When a writ of sequestration has been issued as provided
in this article and the rules of civil procedure, the defendant may seek
a dissolution of the writ by written motion filed with the court.
(b) A hearing on the motion to dissolve the writ shall be held and the
issue determined not later than 10 days after the motion to dissolve is
filed, unless the parties agree to an extension of time. At the hearing,
the writ shall be dissolved unless the party who secured the issuance of
the writ proves the specific facts alleged and the grounds relied upon for
its issuance.
(c) If the writ is dissolved, the action shall proceed as if no writ had
been issued except that an action for damages for wrongfully securing the
issuance of the writ must be brought as a compulsory counterclaim. In
addition to all other elements of damages, the party moving to dissolve
the writ may recover his reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the dis-
solution of the writ.(d) If the writ is dissolved and the personal property sought to be
subjected to the writ is consumer goods, as that term is defined in the
Texas Business and Commerce Code [TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.109 (1968)], the defendant or the party in possession shall be en-
titled to damages which shall be reasonable attorney's fees and the
greatest of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), the finance charge contracted
for, or actual damages. No damages may be awarded for the failure of
the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the specific
facts alleged and such failure is a result of a bona fide error. For a
bona fide error to be available as a defense, the plaintiff must prove
the use of reasonable procedures to avoid such error.(e) A motion to dissolve the writ is cumulative of the right of replevy,
and the filing of the motion to dissolve shall stay any further proceed-




in Mitchell to specify what type of post-seizure hearing will 'be acceptable.
The Garcia court interpreted the Mitchell post-seizure hearing as 'being an
"immediate opportunity for a dissolution of the writ with a hearing on the
merits of the case."'109 If this is to 'be taken literally, the amended Texas
statute may be deficient for merely providing a hearing to test the grounds
justifying the issuance of the writ. 110 Rigidly to require adjudication upon
the merits in all cases soon after issuance of a writ, on the other hand, would
not only place an intolerable administrative 'burden upon courts but would
also 'be out of tune with the concept of flexibility found in Mitchell."' Nev-
ertheless, there has emerged from Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing a
"balancing of interests" doctrine which appears to require that ex parte proce-
dures accommodate a wide range of situations."12 A particular case may in-
volve an extremely complex fact situation coupled with a severe deprivation.
The proper balancing accommodation in such a case may very well be an
immediate post-seizure adjudication upon the merits. For this outcome, the
amended Texas statute has provided no procedures. One final problem is
that North Georgia Finishing spoke in terms of an early hearing.1 13 Such
language does not illogically suggest that some situations may indeed neces-
sitate a prior hearing.' 1 4  For these situations, the amended Texas statute
would again have no procedure.
Immediately subsequent to the Supreme Court's holding in Sniadach"15 the
lower courts were evenly split as to whether the Court's due process attack
on garnishment should be confined -to wages." 6 If Fuentes did not confirm
that the due process doctrine applied in Sniadach would extend to garnish-
109. 380 F. Supp. at 1259 (emphasis added). One writer has suggested that the
Garcia court misread Mitchell. Note, Federal District Court Declares Texas Sequestra-
tion Procedure Unconstitutional, 12 Hous. L. REV. 732, 738 (1975).
110. The amended statute provides for a hearing within ten days on the grounds for
issuance not on the merits. Ch. 470, § 1, [19751 Tex. Laws 1246, 1247. In addition, the
statute places a burden on the debtor to come forward and request a post-seizure hearing.
The Louisiana statute, however, demands that a creditor prove grounds for issuance at a
post-seizure hearing. LA. CODE Cry. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961). In Texas, absent
a debtor's motion for a hearing, the creditor will not be put to such proof in a bilateral
forum. A New York statute has recently been found unconstitutional on similar grounds.
See Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), prob. juris.
noted, 421 U.S. 908 (1975). A final problem arises with respect to the ten-day limit. If
the courts uniformly schedule a hearing only after a maximum time period (i.e., ten
days), the delay in some cases may be constitutionally impermissible.
111. The majority in Mitchell took issue with the inflexibility of the Fuentes holding.
416 U.S. at 610.
112. Id.
113. 419 U.S. at 606.
114. It is important to remember that North Georgia Finishing openly spoke favora-
bly of Fuentes when the Georgia statute could easily have been struck down by sole
reliance on the principles from Mitchell. See notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text.
115. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
116. Three federal district courts determined the Sniadach opinion was confined to
wages. Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Black Watch
Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); American Olean Tile Co. v.
Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970). Three state supreme courts, however,
extended the Sniadach opinion to other forms of property. Randone v. Appellate Dept. of
S. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924
(1972); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87
(1970); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
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ment of other types of property, 117 North Georgia Finishing most assuredly
did. 18 Following Fuentes a Texas court of civil appeals, in Southwestern
Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc.," 9 held the Texas garnishment statute
to be unconstitutional. The court determined that the statute did not provide
,the opportunity for a prior hearing mandated in Fuentes.20 The court made
no mention of Mitchell. However, since the statute also fails to provide safe-
guards which -require specific facts in the affidavit and the opportunity for
an immediate post-seizure hearing, 121 the court's holding would be unchanged
by a Mitchell analysis. The court's same analysis would also appear to inval-
idate the Texas attachment statute. 122 Under these circumstances, why the
Texas legislature did not also amend the attachment and garnishment stat-
utes is a mystery.
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TEXAS, CALIFORNIA,
AND FLORIDA AMENDMENTS
The Supreme Court decisions indicate that extensive procedures designed
to accommodate the balancing of both debtor and creditor interests are re-
quired to satisfy procedural due process in ex parte proceedings. Two
states' 23 have amended their prejudgment seizure statutes to provide a range
of procedures which are far more extensive than those in Texas. An exami-
nation of the amended statutes in these states will serve to demonstrate the
limits of the current Texas procedures.
A. Sequestration and Replevin
California and Florida procedures currently provide that upon a creditor's
application for a writ of replevin the court shall issue to the debtor an order
to show cause why the claimed property should not 'be seized. 124 Under the
Florida statute, the show cause order must state a date and time for the hear-
ing 12"5 and fix the manner of service upon -the debtor.126 If the court deter-
117. The Fuentes opinion states that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment speaks of
'property' generally." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).
118. The North Georgia Finishing opinion states: "We are no more inclined now than
we have been in the past to distinguish among different kinds of property in applying the
Due Process Clause." North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608
(1974).
119. 504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ). This
case has recently been cited with approval by another Texas court. See Texas Commerce
Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Tripp, 516 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1974, writ
granted).
120. 504 S.W.2d at 594.
121. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (1966).
122. Id. art. 275.
123. The two states are California and Florida. These states were chosen because,
like Texas, they amended their statutes subsequent to a holding of unconstitutionality in
the courts. The Florida statute was amended after Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972). California amended its statute after Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d
1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
124. CAL. Civ. CODE § 512.040 (West Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.065 (Supp.
1975).
125. The date set for the hearing must be at least five days but no more than ten days
from service of the order. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.065(2)(a) (Supp. 1975).
126. Id. H§ 78.065(2)(c), (d). In addition the order must inform the debtor of the
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mines after service that the debtor has clearly waived his right to a hearing,' 27
the writ will issue.128  Absent the waiver, the court will determine at the
hearing ,by a consideration of the showings made by the parties whether the
creditor's claim has probable validity.129  If the court finds probable validity,
the property will be seized unless the debtor posts a bond.13 0
The Florida procedure provides safeguards for the creditor. 131 If the cred-
itor presents to the court evidence which reasonably tends to show -that the
debtor is engaging in conduct which places the value of the alleged collateral
in jeopardy, the court may issue a temporary restraining order to prevent such
conduct. 132 The court also has the discretion, upon a showing that the debtor
will probably violate a restraining order pending a hearing on a show cause
order, immediately to issue a writ of replevin.' 33
The California procedure134 is basically similar to that set out above, with
one exception. Like its Florida counterpart,13 5 California procedure requires
a probable cause showing 'before an ex parte writ may be issued.' 30  How-
ever, unlike the Florida procedure, the California procedure additionally re-
quires that "[tihe property is not necessary for the support of the defendant
or his family .... ,,137 In this respect the California procedure appears to
be more debtor oriented -than the Florida approach.
The amended Texas sequestration statute contains none of the pre-seizure
safeguards found in California or Florida. In Texas there is no provision
that accords a debtor an opportunity for a prior hearing under any circum-
stances. The amended Texas procedure merely provides two outcomes: -the
writ will issue or it will not. A Texas creditor may seek a temporary restrain-
ing order under Texas rules of procedure.' 38 However, since the grounds
required for a restraining order would appear also to be sufficient grounds
for the issuance of a writ,' 3 9 -the distinction is inconsequential.
The Texas position, as expressed in the amended sequestration statute, is
that a prior hearing will in no case be necessary; if a creditor's affidavit is
insufficient, no writ will issue. There are two likely dangers inherent in such
a position. First, the procedure may create a presumption in favor of the
manner in which he may contest the creditor's claim and that failure to appear will cause
issuance of the writ. Id. §§ 78.065(2)(e), (f).
127. Id. § 78.075 sets out the manner in which a debtor may have waived his right to
a hearing.
128. Id. § 78.067(1).
129. Id. § 78.067(2).
130. Id.
131. Id. §§ 78.069, .063.
132. Id. § 78.069.
133. ld. § 78.073.
134. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 511.010-515.030 (West Supp. 1975).
135. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.069 (Supp. 1975).
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 512.020(b)(3)(iii) (West Supp. 1975) provides in part: "A
writ of possession may be issued ex parte ...if probable cause appears that ...[t]he
ex parte issuance of a writ of possession is necessary to protect the property."
137. Id. § 512.020(b)(3)(i).
138. TEx. R. Civ. P. 680.
139. In fact, absent specific facts which clearly show the danger of immediate and
irreparable injury, loss or damage, the court will conduct a prior hearing upon applica-
tion for a temporary restraining order. Id. See Millwrights Local No. 2484 v. Rust Eng'r
Co., 433 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. 1968); Ex parte Pierce, 161 Tex. 524, 342 S.W.2d 424, cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961).
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creditor. Such a presumption will cause a court simply to issue a writ upon
the presentation of marginal facts in a creditor's affidavit, leaving adequate
review for the post-seizure hearing. The second danger is that the statute
may create a debtor's presumption. In this case marginal facts may prevent
issuance of the writ, leaving adequate review for an adjudication upon the
merits. 140  Either presumption would appear to be in conflict with the Su-
preme Court's evolving balancing standard for due process. A presumption
favoring either creditor or debtor will by its nature preclude fair review of
all concerned interests. For example, specific facts which are difficult of
proof inherently evoke doubt, especially when it is considered that the facts
are presented in the creditor's own self-interest. The facts may show no more
than the creditor's conviction in his rights.14 1  On the other hand, the facts
may possibly support 'a valid claim. When a judge may not procedurally re-
solve these doubts in a prior bilateral hearing, any action taken must be pre-
sumptive. Depending upon a judge's presumption of the equities, the debtor
will lose his property with doubtful grounds or the creditor's interest in the
property will be subjected to the danger of loss without the opportunity to
confront the debtor in a judicially supervised forum. The result is not a fair
protection accorded by a balancing of all involved interests, nor is it the rea-
soned conclusion 142 that the Texas statute pretends to prescribe. Rather, the
result is a ministerial determination 143 providing no better due process protec-
tion than a clerk's issuance of a writ upon conclusory allegations. This is
not to say that all situations require a prior hearing. The prior hearing need
only be an option, not an absolute requirement. A judge presented with spe-
cific facts which are easily provable may certainly find that the balanced in-
terests warrant issuance of an ex parte writ. However, when borderline facts
are presented to a judge, the lack of an option for a prior hearing must inev-
itably make any balancing doctrine meaningless.
The California and Florida procedures protect both creditor and debtor
from judicial presumption by providing an expansive range of options for the
judge faced with a borderline claim. The Florida procedures, for example,
protect all debtors at the outset by providing an opportunity for a prior hear-
ing upon a creditor's application for a writ of replevin.144 The creditor, on
the other hand, may be protected by an ex parte writ when he can establish
to a judge's satisfaction an immediate danger -that the debtor will defraud
him of his alleged security interest. 14 The Florida procedures even provide
140. Considering the variety of harassment tactics employed by some creditors, the
innocent debtor may be better off with a prior hearing than he is with judicially
uncontested possession of the property until a hearing on the merits. See D. CAPLOVITZ,
CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 177-89 (1974).
141. If the debtor is an uneducated consumer without ready access to legal assistance,
the facts may show no more than a creditor's gamble that the debtor will default. See
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83 (1972). In fact, once the property has been
repossessed, there are heavy odds that a debtor will default. See D. CAPLovrrz, supra note
140, at 216-22.
142. Ch. 470, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 1246.
143. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 632-33 (1974) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
144. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.065 (Supp. 1975).
145. Id. § 78.073.
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for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in cases where a judge may
not be entirely satisfied that an immediate danger exists.146  These statutes,
accordingly, provide a judge with a wide spectrum of procedures readily
adaptable to all possible situations which may arise. Such a spectrum makes
available a procedure for whatever the result of the judge's 'balancing of the
conflicts involved. The amended Texas statute, unfortunately, is not so flex-
ible.
B. Attachment and Garnishment
The Texas attachment and garnishment statutes have not recently been
amended. A Texas court, however, has adjudged the garnishment statute
to be unconstitutional. 1 47 The attachment statute appears to suffer from the
same deficiencies. The following analysis will examine the statutes' weak
points and explore a variety of factors which should be taken into account
in any attempt to cure those infirmities.
Under the Texas attachment statute 48 judges and clerks may issue a writ
directing a sheriff to seize non-exempt property 4 of a debtor to prevent frus-
tration of a creditor's debt.1 0 In order for the writ to issue the creditor must
file an affidavit stating that there is a debt owed.' 5 ' In addition, the creditor
must state the amount of the debt and one of eleven grounds for issuance.' 52
146. Id. § 78.069.
147. Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
148. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 275 (1973).
149. Id. art. 288. In Texas, particular kinds of property, such as wages, are exempt
from attachment or garnishment. See, e.g., id. arts. 6228a, § 9 (pensions), 6243e, § 13
(Firemen's Relief and Retirement Fund).
150. See Orr & Lindsley Shoe Co. v. Harris, 82 Tex. 273, 18 S.W. 308, 309-10
(1891); Lipscomb v. Rankin, 139 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1940, no
writ).
151. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 275 (1973).
152. The judges and clerks of the district and county courts and justices of
the peace may issue writs of original attachment, returnable to their re-
spective courts, upon the plaintiff, his agent or attorney, making an
affidavit stating:
(1) That the defendant is justly indebted to the plaintiff, and the
amount of the demand; and
(2) That the defendant is not a resident of the State, or is a foreign
corporation, or is acting as such; or
(3) That he is about to remove permanently out of the State, and
has refused to pay or secure the debt due the plaintiff; or
(4) That he secretes himself so that the ordinary process of law can
not be served on him; or
(5) That he has secreted his property for the purpose of defrauding
his creditors; or
(6) That he is about to secrete his property for the purpose of de-
frauding his creditors; or
(7) That he is about to remove his property out of the State, without
leaving sufficient remaining for the payment of his debts; or
(8) That he is about to remove his property, or a part thereof, out of
the county where the suit is brought, with intent to defraud his creditors;
or
(9) That he has disposed of his property, in whole or in part, with
intent to defraud his creditors; or
(10) That he is about to dispose of his property with intent to de-
fraud his creditors; or
(11) That he is about to convert his property, or a part thereof, into
money, for the purpose of placing it beyond the reach of his creditors; or
1975]
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The creditor must post a bond to insure prosecution of the claim and deter
wrongful attachment. 15 3 The debtor may regain possession of the property
by posting a bond for double the value of the debt.'5
A writ of garnishment may also be issued by a judge or clerk. 155  The
writ, however, is directed at a third party (the garnishee) rather than the
debtor.156 For the writ to issue the creditor must allege that there is a just,
due, and unpaid debt, and that the debtor does not hold property within the
jurisdiction of the court sufficient to satisfy such debt. 57 The creditor must
post a bond' , and state that the writ is not pursued to injure either the debtor
or the garnishee.'5 "
Attachment and garnishment statutes in California'0 0 and Florida' 6 ' do not
offer so extensive a due process protection as do their respective replevin stat-
utes. Like Texas, neither state affords an opportunity for a prior hearing.
The similarity, however, ends there. Under the California procedure a cred-
itor must present an affidavit which establishes a "prima facie" case that issu-
ance of a writ is justified. 16 2 If the court finds the affidavit satisfactory, it
will issue a temporary restraining order' 0 3 accompanied 'by a notice of a hear-
ing to determine whether a writ shall issue.'0 4  At this hearing the court will
determine either that the writ shall issue or that the temporary restraining
order shall be dissolved. 165 The court may, in its discretion, forego the tem-
porary restraining order if the creditor satisfactorily demonstrates the pres-
ence of a substantial danger that the debtor will ignore a temporary restrain-
ing order and in some manner dispose of -the property pending the hearing
on the order. 166 If the writ is issued in this manner the debtor is afforded
the same opportunity for a hearing as he would be given if a temporary re-
straining order had issued. 167
The Florida procedures' s are somewhat narrower than their counterparts
in California. In Florida a restraining order is not issued. Upon a specific
showing by the creditor that the debtor will act in a manner to frustrate the
debt, the court may immediately issue the writ.'6 9 Similar to the Texas pro-
(12) That the debt is due for property obtained under false pretenses.
id.
153. Id. art. 279.
154. Id. art. 290; TEx. R. Civ. P. 599.
155. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (1966).
156. See, e.g., Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 52, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042 (1937); Blanks
v. Radford, 188 S.W.2d 879, 885-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
157. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4076(2) (1966). A writ of garnishment may
also issue where an original attachment has been issued or the creditor holds an
unsatisfied judgment. Id. arts. 4076(1), (3).
158. Tax. R. Civ. P. 658(a).
159. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4076(2) (1966).
160. CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 537-553.5 (West Supp. 1975).
161. FLA. STAT. ANN. H§ 76.01-.32, 77.01-.28 (Supp. 1975).
162. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 538.1 (West Supp. 1975).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 538.2.
165. Id. § 538.4.
166. Id. § 538.5(b).
167. Id. §538.5(d).
168. The Florida attachment and garnishment statutes are procedurally identical.
Reference in subsequent footnotes will be made to attachment procedures only.
169. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 76.04 (Supp. 1975).
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cedure, 7 0 the required showing is based on a list of situations. 1 7' Upon the
issuance of the writ, however, the debtor in Florida is afforded an immediate
hearing at which he may challenge the creditor's allegations. 1 72 The writ will
be dissolved if the court finds the creditor's allegations to be untrue.' 73 Con-
versely, under the Texas procedures the debtor is not afforded any hearing
at which he may challenge the creditor's allegations. The Texas debtor may
regain possession of the property in question only by posting a replevy
bond.174
Both Mitchell and Fuentes involved summary seizure by secured cred-
itors.' 75  In ex parte procedures under an attachment or garnishment statute,
on the other hand, the creditor has an interest only in the debt, not in the
property attached or garnished. A due process balancing of the situation re-
garding a creditor seeking to attach or garnish a debtor's property, in which
the creditor's only interest is satisfaction of an extraneous debt, would appear
to weigh in favor of some sort of pre-seizure safeguard. The Supreme Court
has directly considered this situation in the garnishment of wages area.1 7 6
North Georgia Finishing did not reach this question as the Georgia statute, 77
like the Texas statute, did not provide any post-garnishment hearing "to
demonstrate at least probable cause for the garnishment.' 178 This issue was
reached, however, in Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co. 179 In -that case a federal
district court struck down the New York attachment statute for its failure to
grant the debtor "an immediate post-seizure hearing at which the creditor-
plaintiff must prove the grounds 'upon which the writ issued.' "110 Although
such a finding alone was dispositive,' 8 ' the court proceeded to make note of
170. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 275 (1973).
171. The creditor may have an attachment on a debt actually due him by
his debtor, when the debtor:
(1) Will fraudulently part with his property before judgment can be
obtained against him.(2) Is actually removing his property out of the state.
(3) Is about to remove his property out of the state.
(4) Resides out of the state.
(5) Is actually moving himself out of the state.
(6) Is about to move himself out of the state.
(7) Is absconding.
(8) Is concealing himself.
(9) Is secreting his property.
(10) Is fraudulently disposing of his property.(11) Is actually removing himself beyond the limits of the judicial cir-
cuit in which he resides.(12) Is about to remove himself out of the limits of such judicial
circuit.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 76.04 (Supp. 1975).
172. Id. § 76.24.
173. id.
174. TEX. R. Civ. P. 599. The debtor may also seek relief for wrongful attachment or
garnishment by filing a separate action for the creditor's bond. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 279 (1973); TEX. R. Civ. P. 658a.
175. A secured creditor has a security interest, usually by virtue of an installment
contract, in the debtor's property. The debt is the purchase price plus a finance charge
for the property. See Mitchell v. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1974).
176. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
177. GA. CODE ANN. chs. 46-1 to -99 (1973).
178. 419 U.S. at 607.
179. 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), prob. juris. noted, 421 U.S. 908 (1975).
180. 383 F. Supp. at 648.
181. Id. at 649.
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two factors which weigh in favor of some type of pre-seizure safeguard. The
first of -these is the creditor's lack of a "possessory interest in the attached
property.'1 82  The court did not give explanation for this statement, but -the
logic attending the argument is obvious. Unlike the secured creditor-debtor
controversy, there is no dispute as to ownership of the property. By reposses-
sion the secured creditor is demanding his contractual right to the property.
The unsecured debtor, conversely, has exclusive rights to the property.' 83
The debtor's rights include protection of that property by the state from theft
and vandalism. It does not 'follow that the debtor's exclusive rights in the
property should not also be protected in some manner from ex parte seizure
upon a creditor's claim to an extraneous debt. As a second factor, the court
determined that the nature of a creditor's allegations may weigh, in some
cases, in favor of a pre-seizure safeguard.' 8 4  A creditor's allegation of a
debtor's fraud, for example, may be "ill-suited" for ex parte review.' 8l  A
fair determination of a creditor's request for ex parte seizure in such a situa-
tion would require a prior hearing.
Ex parte attachment may have survived despite these difficulties as a
method insuring that a state will retain jurisdiction over the controversy. 86
However, in the past few decades the Supreme Court has extended the power
of a state's jurisdiction over foreign debtors to a point which invalidates re-
liance on such justification.'8 7 There still may be justification for ex parte
seizure, on the other hand, when a creditor presents factually convincing evi-
dence that a debtor, absent attachment, will conduct himself pending litiga-
tion in such a manner as to expose the creditor to the danger of an unsatis-
fied judgment. The court in Sugar recognized such a situation, 88 but found
that factually convincing evidence may not be present in all controversies. 189
Of the ,three statutes examined, only California's statutes offer a court the
opportunity to opt for some type of safeguard pending seizure.' 90 Califor-
nia's temporary restraining order, nevertheless, does encumber the property,
albeit to a lesser extent, without prior notice and hearing. At the other ex-
treme are the Texas statutes which offer no hearing pending final judgment.
Assuming the Texas statutes were to 'be amended in the same manner as the
amended Texas sequestration statute, it is submitted that the statutes would
not stand under a controversy similar to that presented in Sugar v. Curtis
Circulation Co.191 Due process demands procedures that must accommodate
182. Id. In fact, the creditor has no interest at all prior to levy.
183. The situation would be further complicated if a third-party creditor had a
security interest in the property.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. The Florida statute, for example, authorizes attachment when the debtor is a
non-resident, or a resident debtor is about to remove himself or his property from thejurisdiction of the court. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 76.04 (Supp. 1975); cf. TEx. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 275 (1973).
187. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
188. 383 F. Supp. at 649.
189. Fraud, for example, presents difficult issues of proof. Id. at 649-50.
190. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 538.1-.5 (West Supp. 1975).
191. 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), prob. juris. noted, 421 U.S. 908 (1975).
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a balancing of all interests involved. The Texas procedures, in some circum-
stances, will not accommodate the interests of either debtor or creditor.
C. A Creditor's Right to Pre-Seizure Safeguards
In the area of provisional creditors' remedies, the due process movement
has been a debtor's movement. The debtor has often been categorized as
a poor, helpless consumer at the hands of an oppressive creditor.192  Such
a categorization is not surprising after a reading of the facts in some of the
more spectacular consumer protection cases. 193 The creditor has tradition-
ally been able to protect himself to some extent against a debtor's default
by a finance charge or the increased price of consumer items sold on credit.' 94
Misuse of these practices by a dishonest faction of creditors' 95 has stigmatized
creditors as a class.
Due process, however, is an individual right which must be afforded no
less to creditors than to debtors. Therein lies the dilemma. How may ade-
quate protection be provided to both? To grant the dishonest debtor a prior
hearing may effectively frustrate the rights of a creditor before any opportu-
nity for a judicial determination may take place. On the other hand, to deny
an honest debtor the opportunity to expose abusive credit practices before
his goods are seized would be an unwarranted intrusion upon his rights. A
solution to this dilemma is balancing.
A fair determination of individual rights by balancing cannot be achieved
if statutory procedures do not guarantee an accommodation for both sets of
interests. This is the point at which the recently amended Texas sequestra-
tion statute fails. Strange as it may seem, the Texas procedures do not in
all circumstances protect the creditor. The debtor in all circumstances is
guaranteed the opportunity to challenge, before a judge, a creditor's claim
to possession pending adjudication upon the merits.196 The creditor is not
afforded a parallel guarantee, the right to a bilateral hearing when his factual
allegations are too complex or insubstantial to warrant issuance of a writ.
The significance of this imbalance may be demonstrated by the following ex-
ample. In a secured credit transaction the debtor has complete possession
upon default under a security agreement. A balancing of interests upon the
creditor's alleging the debtor's default would necessarily take into considera-
tion the amount of unpaid balance. Suppose the debtor has allegedly de-
faulted soon after purchase and the creditor can only present borderline facts.
The creditor has reason to fear that the debtor may conduct himself in a man-
192. See generally D. CAPLovrrz, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN
DEFAULT (1974).
193. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
194. Hearings on the Federal Trade Commission Report on Credit Practices Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1968).
195. See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup.
Ct. 1969); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S. 757 (Dist. Ct.
1966). See generally Note, The Assignment and Discounting of Consumer Installment
Contracts: Transactions Within the Periphery of the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regula-
tion Z, 29 Sw. L.J. 622 (1975).
196. Ch. 470, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 1246, 1247.
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ner dangerous to the creditor's interest since the debtor has the property in
his possession without paying more than a small portion of the purchase price.
Yet, the creditor can do no more than present a sales agreement and allege
the debtor's non-payment. Despite his substantial equity in the property, the
creditor is not guaranteed, under these circumstances,1 97 the opportunity to
confront the debtor's claim of possession pending adjudication. The court
may, of course, issue the writ and stage the confrontation immediately after
seizure. But this would be a compromise, not a balanced determination, of
the creditor-debtor conflict.
However, debtor-creditor relations are seldom so simple. The right of pos-
session pending adjudication may in the more complex situation present ex-
treme problems of unilateral proof. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, if
the parties' rights are to be balanced, a pre-seizure safeguard of some type
must be made available in some circumstances. Practically speaking, a judge
in his discretion may order some form of preliminary safeguard even though
the statute does not so provide. Due process, however, speaks in terms of
guarantees, not discretion. California and Florida provide those guarantees
by incorporating within the scope of their statutes a broad range of proce-
dures which secure safeguards for creditor and debtor alike. The Texas stat-
utes, especially with respect to attachment and garnishment, are limited in
comparison.
IV. DUE PROCESS BALANCING
North Georgia Finishing did little if anything to develop the ",balancing
of interests" doctrine -that had evolved in the Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell
decisions. One possible explanation for this failure is that a 'balancing proc-
ess has been a traditional method of resolution for -the Court in other areas
of the law.' 98  Accordingly, any particular form the balancing is to take with
respect to provisional creditors' remedies may have been viewed by the Court
as a matter of mechanics to be worked out 'by lower courts.' 99 Of course,
this solves none of the immediate problems. 200
197. An ex parte writ is issued only when the court may reasonably conclude that
there is immediate danger to the property. Id.
198. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (fourth amendment criminal problems); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (regulation of interstate commerce). For a discussion of
the balancing in Roe v. Wade see Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. Rv. 1, 10-15 (1973).
199. This is actually a very sensible explanation of the Court's action. Given the
diversity of interests which may arise in debtor-creditor disputes, most of which will
never appear in a single case, the Court could not be so foolhardy as to attempt to set
out a universally applicable formula of balancing procedures. Lower courts, which are
closer to the issues involved in debtor-creditor disputes, are now free to apply balancing
techniques according to a particular state's legislative scheme and the nature of the
dispute which has arisen. Once these balancing techniques have been applied by the
lower courts, the Supreme Court is free to affirm, modify, or reject them in so far as
they accomplish the ends which due process demands.
200. Although the Court's refusal to develop the balancing doctrine may be justified,
its failure to specify what procedures may be necessary to carry out the safeguards
expounded in Mitchell is astounding. If a balancing process is to operate equitably, it
must be afforded a medium through which the result may be channeled. In a request for
ex parte seizure by a creditor, for example, a court may find that the nature of the claim
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A general area of confusion concerning due process balancing has stemmed
from the Supreme Court's attitude toward defining what due process proce-
dures may be required in future cases. In the area of revocation of parole
the Court has specifically defined the type of procedures necessary. 201 With
respect to pre-judgment creditors' remedies, however, the Court has failed to
specify the form or nature of a required hearing.202  The Court's failure is
baffling because the mechanical aspects of any due procedure must be taken
into account by the "balancing of interests" doctrine. The relative usefulness
of a set of procedures must undoubtedly tip the scales. The allegation of
a debtor's -fraud in an unsecured creditor's application for summary attach-
ment, for example, presents a difficult issue for determination. 20 Due proc-
ess may in such a case require a prior hearing for a sufficient resolution of
the validity of the allegations. 20 4 On the other hand, an immediate post-seiz-
ure hearing may be sufficient in the case of a secured creditor's affidavit al-
leging a debt past due.205 The severity of a deprivation, then, will be en-
hanced or discounted by -the relative usefulness of the due process procedures
requested. 206
The narrow scope of the procedural remedies provided by the amended
Texas sequestration statute necessarily limits the "balancing of interests" doc-
trine. The statute balances interests only in a broad sense. Creditor-debtor
conflicts are placed in two groups. The conflicts which warrant ex parte issu-
ance of a writ compose a group granted wholesale protection in the form of
a post-seizure hearing. The remaining conflicts, regardless of the interests
involved, are not guaranteed any remedy until adjudication. Some form of
summary action, however, is desirable from the point of view of the state
and its citizenry since summary action protects the availability of credit at
accessible interest rates.20 7  Accordingly, when the only alternative is no
alleged is so difficult of proof that issuance of a writ on the facts would be unwarranted.
Some form of prior hearing may be warranted. The failure of a state statute to provide a
prior hearing under these circumstances may render that statute unconstitutional.
201. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972), which listed the prerequi-
sites for a revocation hearing.
202. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972). Although the requirement for
a prior hearing has been modified somewhat, the Court's most recent decision in the area
also fails to elaborate upon the form of the safeguards set out. See North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 602 (1975).
203. The court in Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), prob. juris. noted, 421 U.S. 908 (1975), stated that "such issues, which involve
determination of subjective elements of motive and intent, are notably unsuitable to
determination on documentary proof alone."
204. Id. at 649-50.
205. Documentary proof for an ex parte determination is well-suited for showing the
existence of a debt and a debtor's default. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,
617-18 (1974).
206. For a detailed analysis of this area see Note, Specifying the Procedures Required
by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1510(1975).
207. The length of time between default and judgment allows a deterioration in the
resale value of the goods which is unrecoverable by the creditor. Therefore, from th
creditor's standpoint the lack of a summary procedure will either curtail availability of
credit or increase its cost to low-income consumers. Note, Provisional Remedies and Due
Process in Default-Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 653, 700-01. For
an interesting cost analysis of procedural due process see Scott, Constitutional Regulatioll
of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REV.
807 (1975).
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summary action in any form, placement of a conflict into the first group is
the most appealing choice. Assuming, then, that the majority of conflicts will
fall into the first group, the statutory procedures protect the majority's inter-
est in summary action, not the individual's right to due process.
This wholesale balancing, it is submitted, stems from a misconception of
the due process question. If balancing is to weigh a majority's interest in
summary action, the resulting determination is legislative, not judicial. 20 8
The due process right, it must be remembered, was not intended to be limited
by -the interests of the majority. 209 Due process, rather, is the individual's
protection from the majority where the individual's injury may be in the best
interest of the majority. 210  The validity of the ",balancing of interest" doc-
trine as applied to creditors' prejudgment remedies depends, therefore, upon
a balancing of individual interests on both sides. If, in a particular case,
a debtor's property is to be summarily seized, the creditor's interest in the
protection of the debt must be weighed with the debtor's interest in a wrong-
ful deprivation of his property. This analysis refutes the argument that cred-
itors' ex parte remedies must ,be preserved to ensure availability of credit at
low interest rates. 211 The individual's due process protection is separate and
distinct from the interests of the majority of his fellow citizens. 212 To confuse
the interest of the individual with the interest of the majority is to misconstrue
the issue.
V. CONCLUSION
There should be no question as to whether a debtor must be afforded due
process under state action on behalf of a creditor for the deprivation of a
debtor's property. Due process is a guarantee that arbitrary and unfair gov-
ernmental action will not interfere with an individual's constitutional right of
liberty and property.213 In this light, due process protects the individual by
making a clear record for later judicial review214 that the facts upon which
deprivation of liberty or property is based are legitimate. 215 There can be
no "balancing" of this protection. The issue with respect to provisional cred-
itors' remedies is, rather, a question of what type of due process protection
shall be afforded a debtor or creditor. To this issue and to this issue alone
may the "balancing of interests" doctrine apply.
If confined to the individual interests of creditor and debtor, the "balancing
of interests" doctrine has a legitimate role in the application of due process
208. See Note, supra note 206, at 1523-27.
209. Prohibitions in the Constitution were enacted to limit the powers of the
Government. Id. at 1525.
210. Id. at 1527.
211. See note 207 and accompanying text.
212. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in OxFoRD EssAYs IN JURsPRuDENCE 202,
214-15 (2d Series, A. Simpson ed. 1973).
213. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516 (1884); Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819).
214. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 268-70 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
215. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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safeguards to creditors' ex parte remedies. However, if the doctrine is to be
a flexible yet fair method of applicability, the legislatures, aided by the
courts, must establish procedures designed to facilitate an impartial balancing
of the individual interests involved. These procedures must cover the gambit
of protections that may be available to the respective individuals. Proce-
dures which are so inflexible as simply to afford or deny complete protection
make balancing a futile exercise. Few controversies involve individual equi-
ties which are so one sided. The right to due process when balanced between
individuals must afford the protection to each individual that the equities of
the controversy, when balanced, so demand.
To administer justly balanced protection to parties in controversy, a judge,
if his power is not to be usurped, must have at his disposal as 'broad a range
of procedures as is necessary to accommodate his every determination. The
amended Texas sequestration statute inflexibly offers a choice between two
absolutes: to writ or not to writ? Such inflexibility, unfortunately, may only
operate to produce grave interference with the rights and interest of both
creditor and debtor.
